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RESTRAIN YOUR ENTHUSIASM:  
UNITED STATES v. TAYLOR AND ROBBERY 
ENHANCEMENT FOR RESTRAINT  
OF A VICTIM 
Abstract: In February 2020, the Second Circuit held in United States v. Taylor 
that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines’ enhancement for physical restraint of a 
victim did not apply to a defendant who threatened a victim with a gun during a 
robbery. In reaching its decision, the court created a three-part test to determine 
when a defendant restrained a victim during a robbery. The Taylor test provides a 
much needed limitation on the scope of the enhancementthe application of 
which has expanded in the First, Fourth, and Tenth Circuits to defendants who did 
no more than briefly point a gun at a victim. This Comment examines the different 
approaches to applying the restraint enhancement and their compatibility with the 
goals of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. It argues that the test that the Second 
Circuit proposed in Taylor is the most straightforward and effective way to increase 
clarity and reduce disparity between similarly situated defendants. 
INTRODUCTION 
A man walked into a bank in Utah, told the occupants not to move, and 
pointed a gun around the room before robbing the bank.1 The Tenth Circuit 
found that he used force to “physically restrain” the bank occupants by point-
ing a gun to stop them from walking around or leaving.2 In New York, howev-
er, when a man walked into a store, pulled out a gun, and ordered the clerk not 
to turn around before robbing the store.3 The Second Circuit found that the 
                                                                                                                           
 1 United States v. Miera, 539 F.3d 1232, 1233 (10th Cir. 2008). In United States v. Miera, which 
the Tenth Circuit decided in 2008, the defendant and an accomplice entered a bank, ordered occupants 
to “put their hands up” and said “don’t move” before pointing a realistic-looking pellet gun around the 
room at customers. Id. The Tenth Circuit affirmed two sentencing enhancements to increase the de-
fendant’s sentencing range: one for brandishing a dangerous weapon, a pellet gun, and another for 
physically restraining the victims by pointing the same pellet gun at bank occupants to prevent them 
from impeding the robbery. Id. at 1234. 
 2 Id. at 1234; see U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1 cmt. 1(L) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 
2018) (providing an enhancement for the “physical restraint of a victim”). The Sentencing Guidelines 
define “physical restraint” as the use of force to restrain a victim such as “being tied, bound, or locked 
up.” Id. 
 3 United States v. Paul, 904 F.3d 200, 201 (2d Cir. 2018). In 2018, in United States v. Paul, the 
Second Circuit considered a defendant and two accomplices who entered a pharmacy. Id. One accom-
plice drew a firearm and warned the clerk “if you turn back around I’m going to shoot you” before 
directing the clerk to empty money out of the store safe. Id. The Second Circuit approved the applica-
tion of a seven-year mandatory minimum for brandishing a firearm but remanded to the district court 
for sentencing after finding that the defendant did not forcibly restrain a victim. Id. at 202, 204. 
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robber did not “physically restrain” the clerk because the robber did no more 
than tell him not to move and such immobilizing orders are a part of most rob-
beries.4 Despite the similar actions of the two men, the bank robber in Utah 
faced a sentence ten to twenty-one months longer than the robber in New York, 
based only on the courts’ differing interpretations of the two words “physical 
restraint.”5 
In 2020, in United States v. Taylor, the Second Circuit addressed the disa-
greement between circuits regarding the application of the restraint enhance-
ment.6 The Second Circuit found that courts improperly applied the enhance-
ment to a defendant who had merely implied the presence of a gun to victims.7 
In reaching this decision, the court proposed a three-part test for the applica-
tion of the restraint enhancement.8 
Part I of this Comment discusses the history and purpose of the United 
States Sentencing Guidelines as well as the facts of Taylor.9 Part II explores the 
test for applying the restraint enhancement proposed in Taylor and similar tests 
                                                                                                                           
 4 See id. at 204 (describing the defendant’s instructions ordering the clerk to move to the cash 
register as more restrictive than ordering victims to lie on the floor, but less restrictive than moving 
victims into another room or vault). 
 5 Compare Paul, 904 F.3d at 203 (refusing to apply the physical restraint enhancement for merely 
using a weapon to threaten a victim), and United States v. Anglin, 169 F.3d 154, 164 (2d Cir. 1999) 
(noting that the physical restraint enhancement is not applicable where a defendant has not used force 
to physically restrict a victim’s movements), with Miera, 539 F.3d at 1234 (finding that a defendant 
did use physical restraint because the gun prevented the victim from physically moving). In 2018, in 
Paul, the Second Circuit held that the restraint enhancement required a defendant to do something 
more than command victims to lie down on the ground. 904 F.3d at 203. The court concluded that 
such a command is a feature of nearly all robberies and by creating a separate enhancement for physi-
cal restraint the Commission implied conduct beyond that of the typical robbery. See id. (explaining 
that the Sentencing Commission, by including the examples of tying, binding, or locking up victims, 
emphasized the physical nature of the enhancement); Anglin, 169 F.3d at 164 (declining to adopt the 
government’s argument that repeatedly forcing a victim to lie down and stand up at gunpoint qualifies 
as restraint). The Tenth Circuit also thought that there must be action beyond holding a gun to apply 
the restraint enhancement but held in 2008, in Miera, that pointing a gun at a particular individual or 
commanding victims not to move is additional behavior that goes beyond merely brandishing a weap-
on. See 539 F.3d at 1234 (declaring that physical restraint occurs if a victim is “specifically prevented 
at gunpoint” from movement to facilitate the crime); United States v. Pearson, 211 F.3d 524, 525–26 
(10th Cir. 2000) (applying the enhancement when the defendant uses any force, “including force by 
gunpoint,” to prevent victims from interfering with the offense (quoting United States v. Fisher, 132 
F.3d 1327, 1329–30 (10th Cir. 1997))); U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 2B3.1(b)(2), 5(A) 
(providing the enhancement and the sentencing table). 
 6 961 F.3d 68, 81 (2d Cir. 2020). The defendant, Xavier Oneal, did not actually have a firearm on 
his person during the commission of the robberies but purportedly placed his hand on his belt in a 
manner that implied the presence of a gun to the victims. Id. at 72. 
 7 Id. at 81. 
 8 See id. at 79 (providing the three prongs of the test: that the restraint be (1) actual restraint rather 
than mere use of force, (2) physical in nature, and (3) used to facilitate the robbery); see also infra 
notes 53–56 and accompanying text (explaining the elements of the Taylor test). 
 9 See infra notes 12–49 and accompanying text. 
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that other circuits have used.10 Finally, Part III argues that a standardized test is 
needed for the application of the restraint enhancement and that the Taylor test is 
the clearest and most aligned with the goals of the Sentencing Guidelines.11 
I. THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND AN OVERVIEW OF TAYLOR 
Since the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 
(Guidelines) have greatly influenced the sentencing decisions of judges around 
the country.12 Section A of this Part discusses the Guidelines generally and their 
role in determining the punishment of convicted defendants.13 Section B reviews 
the procedural history and factual background of United States v. Taylor.14 
A. The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 
In 1984, Congress enacted the Sentencing Reform Act, which created the 
U.S. Sentencing Commission (Commission) to draft the Guidelines and reign 
in the discretion of federal trial judges during sentencing.15 Although the basic 
                                                                                                                           
 10 See infra notes 50–90 and accompanying text. 
 11 See infra notes 91–122 and accompanying text. 
 12 See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837 (1984) (codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551–3559 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991–998) (creating the U.S. Sentencing Com-
mission); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 233–34 (2005) (explaining that the mandatory 
Guidelines often had more control over federal sentencing decisions than the judge); Ryan W. Scott, 
Inter-judge Sentencing Disparity After Booker: A First Look, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1, 6–14 (2010) (dis-
cussing the history and purpose of the Guidelines as well as their success at reducing sentencing dis-
parity). 
 13 See infra notes 15–35 and accompanying text. 
 14 See infra notes 36–49 and accompanying text. 
 15 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551–3559 (delineating factors a court should consider in crafting a sentence for 
a convicted person); 28 U.S.C. §§ 991–998 (establishing the U.S. Sentencing Commission). Before the 
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, federal trial judges had extreme discretion to “personalize” sentencing 
decisions, which in practice generated widely disparate sentences among similarly situated defendants. 
See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.13 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018) (preventing disparate 
sentences by requiring courts to sentence within the Guideline range except in “extraordinary and com-
pelling” circumstances subject to appellate review); U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT 
ON THE INITIAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND POLICY STATEMENTS 8 (1987), https://www.ussc.gov/
sites/default/files/pdf/guidelines-manual/1987/manual-pdf/1987_Supplementary_Report_Initial_
Sentencing_Guidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/3CR8-222N] (explaining the Commission’s intention to 
constrain untethered judicial discretion). The Commission is an independent arm of the judiciary 
tasked with adding transparency and consistency to the sentencing process by categorizing and grad-
ing offenses, unifying sentencing provisions, and limiting the total permissible punishment. SUPPLE-
MENTARY REPORT, supra, at 7–8. The Commission’s first version of the Guidelines was mandatory 
and obligated courts to sentence within the calculated Guideline range except in exceptional circum-
stances. Scott, supra note 12, at 9–10. The mandatory Guidelines did reduce sentencing disparity. See 
id. at 9 (measuring a drop in inter-judge sentencing disparity between 1987 and 2004 and attributing 
the decrease to this first version of the Guidelines). The early Guidelines also attracted criticism for 
their inflexibility and the power they gave prosecutors to determine sentences based on how they 
charged crimes. See id. (noting that some commentators thought judges should have more discretion 
to create unique sentences for each defendant). Despite the criticism, Congress opted to make the 
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method for applying the Guidelines has remained the same since 1987, Con-
gress altered the modern Guidelines to allow judges more flexibility to sen-
tence outside of the calculated Guideline range as the Supreme Court mandat-
ed in 2005 in United States v. Booker.16 
The Commission designed the Guidelines to accomplish three goals: in-
crease transparency, reduce disparity, and achieve proportionality in sentenc-
ing.17 Following a conviction for a felony offense, a defendant encounters the 
Guidelines when the court endeavors to determine an appropriate sentence.18 
The Guidelines provide federal judges with a suggested range of imprisonment 
based both on characteristics inherent in the offense and the defendant’s par-
ticular conduct.19 The calculation begins by locating the “base offense level” 
                                                                                                                           
Guidelines even less flexible in 2003 with the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the 
Exploitation of Children Today Act. See PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401, 117 Stat. 650, 
667–76 (2003) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(2)) (reducing the circumstances in which 
a court could vary from the calculated Guideline range); Scott, supra note 12, at 11 (explaining that 
the PROTECT Act removed even more judicial discretion). 
 16 See 543 U.S. at 246 (finding that mandatory Guidelines were unconstitutional); Scott, supra 
note 12, at 41 (describing an uptick in sentencing disparity since Booker, although not rising to the 
1980s pre-Guidelines levels). Today, the Guidelines are no longer mandatory following the 2005 
Supreme Court decision in United States v. Booker, which found that mandatory sentencing Guide-
lines violated the Sixth Amendment. 543 U.S. at 264–65; see U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL 
§ 1A2 (explaining the new advisory role of the Guidelines). Specifically, the old, mandatory Guide-
lines required judges to make findings of fact to determine a defendant’s maximum sentence, a role 
the Constitution reserved exclusively for the jury. Booker, 543 U.S. at 265. To remedy this unconstitu-
tional feature after Booker, the Court excised the mandatory portion of the Sentencing Reform Act, 
rendering the Guidelines “advisory.” Id. at 246. Following Booker, the Act still requires judges to 
calculate the Guideline range and consider it on the record during sentencing. Scott, supra note 12, at 
13. Now, however, judges are free to use their discretion to impose a sentence outside of the recom-
mended range, but such decisions are still reviewable for abuse of discretion. Id. 
 17 U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.3. The Commission’s first goal was honest sentenc-
ing practices, achieved by clearly communicating the expectations of the Guidelines and thus avoiding 
confusion and implicit deception critiqued in the pre-Guidelines sentencing system. Id. Second, the 
Commission defined disparity as different sentences imposed upon similar criminals for committing 
similar offenses. Id. The Commission identified diverging applications of enhancements as a source of 
disparity that the Guidelines sought to eliminate, yet they were not able to reach a completely satisfy-
ing solution to the problem. See id. (explaining that all Guidelines that the Commission promulgates 
are the result of compromise and not a single unified rationale). Finally, the Guidelines system aims to 
generate appropriately different sentences for criminal activity of differing severity. Id. 
 18 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (requiring judges to calculate and consider the applicable Guideline range 
during sentencing decisions); see Booker, 543 U.S. at 233 (excising the portion of the statute which 
made the Guidelines mandatory). The Guidelines aim to standardize the federal sentencing process by 
giving judges a range of acceptable sentences tailored to defendants. See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES 
MANUAL § 1A1.2 (explaining that Congress gave the Sentencing Commission the authority to “re-
view and rationalize” federal sentencing practices). 
 19 U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, AN OVERVIEW OF THE UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION 2 
(2011), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/about/overview/Overview_Federal_Sentencing_
Guidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/UAF7-BXJS]. 
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associated with the conviction in the Guidelines Manual.20 The base level of-
fense increases with the severity of the crime.21 A court may add one or more 
“enhancements” to increase or decrease the severity of the base level offense.22 
Several enhancements are available for each type of offense.23 Enhancements 
allow the court to adjust a sentence to reflect a defendant’s additional criminal 
conduct during the commission of the offense.24 The probation officer scores 
the total level of the offense with the defendant’s “criminal history category” to 
generate the suggested Guideline range of imprisonment.25 
                                                                                                                           
 20 U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1(a)(3). The Guidelines provide different base of-
fense levels for crimes based on the Sentencing Commission’s evaluation of the severity of the con-
duct inherent in the offense, and the base offense level impacts the suggested sentencing range. See 
SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 15, at 17–19 (describing the considerations, such as consisten-
cy and rationality, that led to the development of the base-level offense system). A parole officer, a 
specialist in such calculations, makes the first Guideline calculations in a document called a Presen-
tence Report (PSR). Presentence Overview, U.S. PROB. OFF. FOR THE W. DIST. OF TEX., https://www.
txwp.uscourts.gov/presentence-overview/index.html [https://perma.cc/3XPV-LAV2]. Although not 
binding on the court, the predictions made in the PSR regarding criminal history, enhancements, and 
departures serve as the starting point for the sentencing process. See The Presentence Report, U.S. 
PROB. OFF. FOR THE W. DIST. OF TEX., https://www.txwp.uscourts.gov/presentence-report/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/NJ75-XYLR] (describing the individual parts of the PSR, such as criminal history, 
history of the case, and a victim impact statement). The PSR outlines the specific history of the de-
fendant and the facts of the case for the court to use as a reference in the sentencing process and might 
include a recommendation for Guideline departures. Id. A court may elect to depart from the Guide-
line range if a case presents atypical or extreme factors. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL 
§ 1A1.4(b) (elaborating that although the court has the discretion to depart from the Guideline range, 
departures are subject to review on appeal). 
 21 OVERVIEW, supra note 19, at 2; see U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5(A) (providing the 
Guidelines’ sentencing table). 
 22 See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1 cmt. n.4(A)–(B) (referring to an adjustment on 
the defendant’s base level of offense as an “enhancement”). The Guidelines provide a limited number 
of enhancements for each offense relating to additional conduct associated with the offense. Id. En-
hancements are cumulative and a court may apply multiple enhancements to a single Guideline of-
fense. Id. 
 23 See id. § 1B1.1(a)(3) (describing how the court might apply an enhancement in circumstances 
such as when: the case involved vulnerable victims, the defendant played a key role in a criminal 
enterprise, and the crime involved instances of obstruction of justice). See, e.g., id. § 2B3.1 (b)(1)–(7) 
(noting seven enhancements to the base level offense of robbery). 
 24 See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, AN OVERVIEW OF THE UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMIS-
SION—HOW THE GUIDELINES WORK 2 (2011), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/about/
overview/USSC_Overview.pdf [https://perma.cc/UAC2-AJ2U] (describing that enhancements pro-
vide incremental punishment options for significant additional criminal conduct). 
 25 See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5(A) (providing the sentencing range table). A de-
fendant’s criminal history category is one of three factors used to calculate a defendant’s Guideline 
sentencing range, along with the facts of the instant offense and enhancements. See id. (demonstrating 
that a defendant with a lower criminal history category will have a lower Guideline sentencing range 
than a defendant with a higher criminal history category). A court calculates a defendant’s criminal 
history category by placing their past convictions into the Guidelines’ standardized grid to place the 
defendant in a criminal history category from I to VI. Id.; see OFF. GEN. COUNS., U.S. SENT’G 
COMM’N, CRIMINAL HISTORY GUIDELINE PRIMER 1 (June 2016), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/
files/pdf/training/primers/2016_Primer_Criminal_History.pdf [https://perma.cc/UY95-Q69W] (ex-
plaining that category I is the least serious and category VI is the most severe). The probation officer 
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Despite the Commission’s progress toward standardizing the federal sen-
tencing process, disparate sentencing of similarly situated defendants remains 
an issue.26 A common source of disparity occurs when a court uses a single 
instance of a defendant’s conduct to justify the application of multiple en-
hancements, known as “double counting.”27 Courts disagree on if and when 
double counting is permissible and, as a result, can generate very different sen-
tencing ranges for similarly situated defendants.28 Courts double count by reg-
                                                                                                                           
weighs each of a defendant’s prior convictions according to the seriousness of the offense listed in the 
Guidelines. GUIDELINE PRIMER, supra, at 2–3 (explaining that a past felony conviction will count 
more heavily towards raising a defendant’s criminal history category than, for example, a misdemean-
or conviction). The greater the number and severity a defendant’s past convictions, the higher their 
criminal history category. Id. at 1. This standardized method of calculation attempts to provide the 
court with a measure of a particular defendant’s dangerousness based on their past criminal behavior. 
See id. (describing the method of scoring past convictions to generate a criminal history category). 
 26 James M. Anderson et al., Measuring Inter-judge Sentencing Disparity: Before and After the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J. L. & ECON. 271, 304 (1999). The degree to which the mandatory 
Guidelines reduced sentencing disparity between similarly situated defendants is still a topic of de-
bate. See id. at 279 (explaining that sentencing disparity can be a difficult thing to measure and that 
there are multiple studies exploring the possible reduction in sentencing disparity). It is clear, howev-
er, that the introduction of the mandatory Guidelines in 1984 reduced, but did not eliminate, disparity 
between similarly situated defendants. See id. at 303 (concluding, based on survey data of judge’s 
decisions before and after the Commission introduced the Guidelines, that inter-judge sentencing 
disparity decreased). Disparity may be on the rise following Booker, although not to pre-guideline 
levels. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 245 (rendering the Guidelines advisory); Scott, supra note 12, at 41 
(stating that empirical data indicates that disparity has risen following Booker). The comparative sta-
bility after the shift to advisory Guidelines may be because recommended sentences serve to “anchor” 
judges within the suggested range. See Scott, supra note 12, at 45–46 (explaining that the “anchoring” 
effect of the suggested Guideline sentence may contribute to reducing disparity after Booker). 
 27 See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1(4)(B) (explaining that courts ought to apply 
multiple robbery enhancements cumulatively only for different harm arising out of the same conduct); 
Jacqueline E. Ross, Damned Under Many Headings: The Problem of Multiple Punishment, 29 AM. J. 
CRIM. L. 245, 300, 306 (2002) (identifying that courts’ differing policies regarding double counting 
can lead to variable punishment for similarly-situated defendants and noting that the Guidelines are 
silent on the issue). For example, a court properly applies enhancements for both official victim and 
bodily injury to a defendant who shot a police officer, but it is improper to apply an enhancement for 
abduction and restraint when a defendant forced a victim to walk across the room. See Ross, supra, at 
306 (advocating against applying enhancements where a defendant’s conduct is contained within the 
core offense). Courts will consider all relevant conduct, including criminal acts that an accomplice or 
coconspirator committed which were reasonably foreseeable to the defendant, when choosing en-
hancements. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3(a)(1). In many cases, a court will count one 
set of circumstances or conduct towards multiple enhancements under the Guidelines, thus double 
counting. Ross, supra, at 247. 
 28 Compare United States v. Victor, 719 F.3d 1288, 1290 (11th Cir. 2013) (affirming that applica-
tion of the restraint enhancement for a defendant who moved a bank teller a few steps without touch-
ing her while pretending to have a gun), with United States v. Anglin, 169 F.3d 154, 164 (2d Cir. 
1999) (holding that pointing a gun and instructing victims to “get down” is insufficient to qualify as 
physical restraint). The type of double counting seen in the Eleventh Circuit in 2013, United States v. 
Victor, occurs despite the Guideline prohibition against applying enhancements where the guideline 
for the offense specifically incorporates an enhancing factor. See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL 
§ 3A1.3 cmt. 2 (defining and discouraging double counting); see also Victor, 719 F.3d 1290 (counting 
the defendant’s actions towards an enhancement in the manner described). 
II.-232 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 62:E. Supp. 
ularly applying enhancements based on conduct that is inherent in a crime, 
which commentators see as undermining the goals of the Guidelines.29 When 
courts apply multiple enhancements for a single instance of conduct, they 
counteract the Guidelines’ mission of reducing sentencing disparity and pro-
moting fairness to defendants.30 
The crime of robbery and its associated enhancements provide an excel-
lent illustration of the disparity created when courts have different theories of 
enhancement application.31 Robbery has a Guideline base level of twenty, 
which translates to a recommended sentence between thirty-three and eighty-
seven months of imprisonment, depending on the defendant’s criminal history 
category.32 But not all courts apply the enhancements associated with robbery 
in the same manner.33 Consequently, some circuits will punish a defendant who 
                                                                                                                           
 29 See Ross, supra note 27, at 299 (explaining that double counting is not prohibited by the text of 
the Guidelines, but that it varies by jurisdiction when it is appropriate to do so). The Guidelines con-
done some forms of double counting because the defendant’s single action produces multiple harms. 
See id. (providing the example of a defendant’s extensive planning to support an enhancement for a 
leadership role in a conspiracy and also a “more than minimal planning” enhancement). But disparity 
may arise when the Guidelines are silent on whether courts may apply certain enhancements jointly 
and some jurisdictions double count despite the silence. See id. at 300–01 (advocating that courts 
should avoid applying enhancements jointly where the Guidelines have not explicitly authorized dou-
ble counting to avoid injustice and disparity). 
 30 See, e.g., United States v. Werlinger, 894 F.2d 1015, 1018 (8th Cir. 1990) (explaining that the 
Commission designed the enhancements to work against double counting). Circuit courts, however, 
differ over whether the Commission intended to discourage double counting. See Ross, supra note 27, 
at 300 (stating that the Guidelines support conflicting interpretations). 
 31 See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B3.1 (providing the elements of robbery); Carolyn 
Barth, Aggravated Assaults with Chairs Versus Guns: Impermissible Applied Double Counting Under 
the Sentencing Guidelines, 99 MICH. L. REV. 183, 186 (2000) (examining the disparate application of 
the restraint and abduction enhancements to robbery). For example, courts often apply robbery en-
hancements for both abduction and physical restraint arising out of the same instance of harm. Id.; see 
United States v. Smith, 320 F.3d 647, 658 (6th Cir. 2003) (finding that double counting the same 
conduct towards application of restraint and abduction enhancements was not impermissible); United 
States v. Gall, 116 F.3d 228, 230 (7th Cir. 1997) (rejecting defendant’s argument that a single act can 
constitute either abduction or restraint but not both). But see United States v. Strong, 826 F.3d 1109, 
1117 (8th Cir. 2016) (applying concurrent restraint and abduction enhancements only when the de-
fendant engaged in two separate acts, each justifying one enhancement). 
 32 U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5(A). Robbery is typically a matter of state law, but the 
Hobbs Act incorporated the offense into federal law when a criminal uses threats or violence to inter-
fere with interstate commerce. See 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(1) (codifying the federal charge of Hobbs Act 
robbery). In Taylor, the defendant was charged with Hobbs Act robbery. United States v. Taylor, 961 
F.3d 68, 72 n.2 (2d Cir. 2020). The basic elements of robbery under the Hobbs Act are “the unlawful 
taking or obtaining of personal property” from a person against their will using “actual or threatened 
force, or violence, or fear of injury” to the victim or another. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(1). 
 33 See generally David J. Sandefer, Comment, To Move or Not to Move? That Is the Metaphysical 
Question, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 1973 (2018) (commenting on a circuit split over when to apply the ab-
duction enhancement for the crime of robbery and whether courts should apply the abduction and 
restraint enhancements together). Courts that apply the restraint enhancement more liberally tend to 
emphasize minor aspects of the defendant’s behavior that are not perfectly captured by the basic ele-
ments of robbery or another enhancement. See, e.g., United States v. Pearson, 211 F.3d 524, 526 (10th 
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displays a gun as they attempt to flee separately for both brandishing a firearm 
and restraint even though both actions are implicit to crime of armed robbery.34 
A circuit split over the application of the restraint enhancement risks disparity 
and inconsistent outcomes between similarly situated defendants.35 
B. The Second Circuit’s Approach to the Restraint Enhancement 
In 2020, in United States v. Taylor, the Second Circuit held that the physi-
cal restraint enhancement, § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B), was not applicable to a defendant 
who implied the presence of a gun to victims during the commission of a rob-
bery.36 The Government charged the defendant, Oneal, following the robbery 
of four cell phone stores.37 During the first three robberies, Oneal entered the 
store with his hand in his waistband, behaving as if he had a gun inside his 
jacket, and advised the occupants of the store “this is a robbery” and to “get in 
the back.”38 Finally, Oneal commanded the customers not to do something 
“stupid” before herding the employees into a back room while a coconspirator 
stole cash and merchandise.39 A customer interrupted the fourth and final rob-
bery by announcing that he was a police officer and arrested Oneal after a brief 
chase.40 The jury found Oneal guilty by plea agreement of one count of rob-
bery.41 The plea agreement’s sentencing prediction was based on the parole 
                                                                                                                           
Cir. 2000) (finding that applying enhancements for the use of a firearm and restraint of a victim did 
not constitute double counting because brandishing a gun at a victim does not inevitably restrain the 
victim, even if the restraint resulted from that very brandishing); United States v. Nelson, 137 F.3d 
1094, 1112 (9th Cir. 1998) (upholding the application of both a firearm and a restraint enhancement 
based on an accomplice’s single act of pointing a gun at a victim because the use of a firearm in this 
manner does not encompass the threat of death to the victim). 
 34 U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B3.1(b)(2); see, e.g., United States v. Wallace, 461 F.3d 
15, 34–35 (1st Cir. 2006) (holding that the court properly applied the restraint enhancement together 
with a firearm enhancement).  
 35 Compare Taylor, 961 F.3d at 81 (finding that the restraint enhancement was not applicable to a 
defendant who behaved as if he had a gun to lead victims to another room), with United States v. Vic-
tor, 719 F.3d 1288, 1289 (11th Cir. 2013) (finding that the restraint enhancement was properly applied 
to a defendant who behaved as if he had a gun to lead victims to another room). The variable way in 
which the circuits apply the restraint enhancement is precisely the type of unfair sentencing practice 
the Commission sought to avoid by enacting the Guidelines. See SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra 
note 15, at 9. (describing the bi-partisan goal of the Guidelines as curtailing unwarranted disparity and 
unequal sentences for similar defendants). 
 36 961 F.3d at 81. 
 37 Id. at 71–72. Oneal was one of two defendants tried in connection with the four cellphone store 
robberies. Id. at 72. 
 38 Id. at 72. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. In the plea agreement, the Government made predications as to the potential length of One-
al’s sentence based on the PSR and statements about the defendant’s criminal history category, appli-
cable enhancements, and other factors. Id. at 82 (citing United States v. Wilson, 920 F.3d 155, 163 (2d 
Cir. 2019)). In United States v. Wilson, in 2019, the Second Circuit wrote that it is “good practice” for 
the government to provide defendants with an estimated Guideline range in plea deals to avoid unfair-
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office’s presentence report (PSR) calculations, but the district court differed 
from the prediction by applying enhancements for the use of a dangerous 
weapon and restraint of a victim.42 With these adjustments, Oneal’s total of-
fense level reached twenty-seven, which together with a criminal history cate-
gory of IV generated a recommended Guideline range of 130 to 162 months.43 
Oneal appealed his sentence, arguing that the court had incorrectly ap-
plied the dangerous weapon and restraint enhancements.44 Specifically, he 
claimed that because he had not bound, tied, or even touched the victims dur-
ing the robbery, the trial court had erred by applying the restraint enhance-
ment.45 The Second Circuit ultimately agreed.46 The court focused on the plain 
meaning of the words “physical restraint” and used the commentary’s exam-
                                                                                                                           
ness. See 920 F.3d at 158–61, 163 (noting that the defendant pleaded guilty to a drug conspiracy 
charge based on a sentencing estimate the government provided, only to have the government advo-
cate for a higher Guideline range at the sentencing hearing). Broadly speaking, however, the Guide-
lines do not allow prosecutors to bind a court to a sentencing range agreed upon or estimated in a plea 
bargain. See generally John Gleeson, The Sentencing Commission and Prosecutorial Discretion: The 
Role of the Courts in Policing Sentencing Bargains, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 63 (2008) (discussing the 
Commission’s alterations of prosecutorial bargaining power with defendants and advocating for an 
expanded role for plea bargains under the Guidelines). In Taylor, the government estimated Oneal’s 
Guideline range without the sentencing enhancement for restraint of a victim. 961 F.3d at 72. 
 42 Taylor, 961 F.3d at 72–73. The district court also varied from the plea agreement by calculating 
the defendant’s criminal history in category IV rather than category III, as estimated in the plea 
agreement. Id. at 73. On appeal, Oneal claimed that the government violated the plea agreement by 
arguing for the higher criminal history category at sentencing. Id. at 82. The reviewing court found 
this argument unconvincing because the plea bargain based the category III estimate on a mistake in 
the PSR. Id. 
 43 Id. at 74. The district court granted the defendant a discretionary downward variance in crimi-
nal history category because the judge believed the PSR “overstated” the severity of the defendant’s 
past crimes, bringing the Guideline range down to 100 to 125 months. Id. The district court sentenced 
the defendant to eighty-four months imprisonment, a downward departure from both the calculated 
Guideline range and the range estimated in the plea agreement. Id. 
 44 Id. at 73. The probation office interpreted the Second Circuit’s decision in 1999, in United 
States v. Anglin, to bar the application of the restraint enhancement where a defendant had done no 
more than immobilize victims upon threat of force. Id. (citing United States v. Anglin, 169 F.3d 154, 
164 (2d Cir. 1999)). Thus, the probation office initially shared Oneal’s objection to the application of 
the enhancement. Id. Ultimately, however, it agreed with the court that the application of the en-
hancement was appropriate. Id. 
 45 Brief & Appendix for Appellant Xavier Oneal at 16–17, United States v. Taylor, 961 F.3d 68 
(2d Cir. 2020) (No. 18-1710), 2019 WL 3074792, at *16–17. Oneal also argued that the court applied 
the enhancement for the use of a weapon incorrectly because he did not possess any weapon during 
the robberies. See id. at 14–15 (objecting to the court’s application of the enhancement because the 
defendant did not actually have a firearm and was merely pretending to have a weapon); see also U.S. 
SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B3.1(b)(2)(E) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018) (providing the en-
hancement for use of a weapon during a robbery). 
 46 Taylor, 961 F.3d at 81. It found that the dangerous weapon enhancement was inappropriate 
here because although using an object to create the impression of a weapon does qualify for the en-
hancement, using a hand to imply a separate deadly instrument is too far removed from the purpose of 
the enhancement. Id. at 75–76. 
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ples of tying, binding, and locking up to guide its interpretation.47 The court 
noted that the application of the enhancement should only apply to behavior 
that is not a part of the typical armed robbery.48 With this decision, the Second 
Circuit limited the application of the restraint enhancement, joining the District 
of Columbia, Fifth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits.49 
II. THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S PROPOSED TEST FOR RESTRAINT  
AND COMPETING APPROACHES 
United States v. Taylor, which the Second Circuit decided in 2020, encap-
sulates the tension between courts that liberally apply the restraint enhance-
ment and those that interpret the enhancement more narrowly.50 Section A of 
this Part discusses how the Second Circuit’s decision in Taylor provided a test 
which limits the application of the restraint enhancement and the implications 
of the suggested test.51 Section B discusses alternative approaches to the re-
straint enhancement that other circuits use.52 
                                                                                                                           
 47 See id. at 78 (citing Anglin, 169 F.3d at 164) (analyzing the language of the enhancement and 
comments); United States v. Paul, 904 F.3d 200, 204 (2d Cir. 2018) (interpreting the enhancement 
language prior to Taylor); see also U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1 cmt. n.1(L) (providing 
the enhancement). In United States v. Paul, in 2019, the Second Circuit explained that the examples of 
tying, binding, and locking up, although not exhaustive, demonstrate the type of conduct required to 
trigger the enhancement. See Paul, 904 F.3d at 204 (explaining that in the absence of restraint compa-
rable to binding, locking up, or placing victims in a confining space, the enhancement is not appropri-
ate). 
 48 Taylor, 961 F.3d at 79. Drawing on Paul, the court explained that courts must reserve the en-
hancement for circumstances that went beyond the conduct typical of most robberies. Id.; see Paul, 
904 F.3d at 204 (stating that adding the enhancement in a case where the defendant used a gun to 
direct the clerk to a cash register would simply add punishment to conduct inherent in most store rob-
beries). 
 49 See United States v. Herman, 930 F.3d 872, 875–76 (7th Cir. 2019) (clarifying that “psycho-
logical coercion” alone does not qualify as physical restraint); United States v. Garcia, 857 F.3d 708, 
713 (5th Cir. 2017) (holding that discharging a firearm during a robbery did not go “beyond” normal 
armed robbery behavior); United States v. Parker, 241 F.3d 1114, 1118–19 (9th Cir. 2001) (explaining 
that Congress intended physical restraint to require “something more” than pointing a gun and command-
ing a victim once to go to the floor because nearly all armed robberies involve such behavior); United 
States v. Drew, 200 F.3d 871, 880 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (finding that pointing a gun at a victim was not 
“physical” within the plain meaning of the enhancement because the restraint was not physical in 
nature). 
 50 See 961 F.3d 68, 77–78 (2d Cir. 2020) (citing United States v. Anglin, 169 F.3d 154, 165 (2d 
Cir. 1999)) (describing the enhancement as a provision intended to deal with a special circumstance 
and cautioning that courts must interpret it narrowly to avoid an unwarranted increase the Guidelines’ 
base level of the offense). 
 51 See infra notes 53–69 and accompanying text. 
 52 See infra notes 70–90 and accompanying text. 
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A. The Second Circuit’s Proposed Test 
In Taylor, the Second Circuit distilled its reasoning from previous cases 
into a three-pronged test to restrict the application of the enhancement.53 The 
test first examines the defendant’s actions and requires that the restraint be 
physical in nature.54 Second, the test requires that the physical contact with the 
victim be for the purpose of restraint.55 Finally, the test requires that the re-
straint go beyond what was necessary to facilitate the commission of the 
crime.56 The court sought to limit the application of the restraint enhancement 
to only apply in cases where the intent of the Guidelines warranted it.57 
The first prong requires that the restraint be physical in nature.58 The 
court pointed to the language the Commission chose, requiring the restraint of 
the victim to be “forcible,” and the examples they provided of tying, binding, 
and locking up.59 In this regard, the Second Circuit split from the Third, Sev-
enth, and Ninth.60 This language, the court explained, reveals the Commis-
sion’s intention that the enhancement apply only to cases where the defendant 
                                                                                                                           
 53 Taylor, 961 F.3d at 78–79. The Second Circuit drew heavily from its 1999 reasoning in United 
States v. Anglin to support its decision. See id. (emphasizing that liberal application of the enhance-
ment is antithetical to the purpose of Guideline enhancements); see also 169 F.3d at 165 (articulating 
that the restraint enhancement applies only where a defendant’s conduct goes beyond actions inherent 
to the crime of armed robbery). Anglin dealt with similar circumstances regarding the restraint en-
hancement and thus laid much of the groundwork for the court more than twenty years later in Taylor. 
See Taylor, 961 F.5d at 73 (referencing Anglin as an important part of the court’s decision); Anglin, 
169 F.3d at 163 (describing a defendant who pointed a gun at two bank tellers and instructed them to 
lie on the floor during a robbery). In Anglin, the court found that the district court had incorrectly 
applied the restraint enhancement to the defendant. 169 F.3d at 163. 
 54 Taylor, 961 F.3d at 79. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. The court noted that, for the third prong, restraint that is inseparable from the robbery itself 
weighs against the application of the enhancement because such conduct would double count conduct 
inherent in the offense. Id. Ordering an employee to move to the cash register, for example, is not 
additional conduct separate from the robbery within the third prong of the test. Id. (citing United 
States v. Paul, 904 F.3d 200, 204 (2d Cir. 2018)). 
 57 Id. at 78. Specifically, the court was wary of the trend of liberally applying the restraint en-
hancement because it effectively “increase[s] the Guidelines’ base level, in what one would expect to 
be the considerable majority of robbery cases, from 20 to 22.” Id. at 77–78 (quoting Anglin, 169 F.3d 
at 165). 
 58 Id. at 78. 
 59 See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1 app. n.(L) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018) 
(providing the requirements for the restraint enhancement as well as the examples of tying, locking 
up, or binding a victim). 
 60 Compare Taylor, 961 F.3d at 79 (requiring more than pointing a gun at a bank occupant to 
qualify for the physical restraint enhancement), with United States v. Copenhaver, 185 F.3d 178, 181 
(3d Cir. 1999) (stating that physical restraint occurs when the victim feels they must comply with the 
defendant’s demands), and United States v. Nelson, 137 F.3d 1094, 1112 (9th Cir. 1998) (leading 
victims from one room to another at gunpoint constitutes restraint), and United States v. Doubet, 969 
F.2d 341, 346 (7th Cir. 1992) (explaining that a defendant restrained a victim for purposes of the en-
hancement where the victim felt they were not “free to leave”), abrogated on other grounds by United 
States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87 (1993). 
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restrained a victim’s movement in a manner comparable to being tied or 
bound.61 Effectively, this prong prohibits application of the enhancement in cas-
es where the defendant had no physical contact with any victim, regardless of 
whether victims felt threatened by the presence of a gun or forceful language.62 
The second prong of the proposed test requires that physical force used 
against a victim be for the purpose of restraint, rather than to injure or frighten 
a victim.63 The court concluded that it is more consistent with the plain mean-
ing of the word “restrain” and the Guidelines’ intended application of the en-
hancement to separate simple battery from force used to restrain a victim.64 
                                                                                                                           
 61 Taylor, 961 F.3d at 78 (citing Anglin, 169 F.3d at 164). In Anglin, the court found that an appli-
cation of the restraint enhancement where the defendant had not made physical contact with a victim 
was invalid. 169 F.3d at 165. The court distinguished the defendant’s contactless command for the 
victims to get on the ground while pointing a gun from behavior which is physical in nature, such as 
putting a boot on the throat of a victim to immobilize him during a robbery. See id. at 163 (citing 
United States v. Rosario, 7 F.3d 319, 321 (2d Cir. 1993)) (explaining that a boot on a victim’s throat is 
different in kind and degree than merely pointing a gun). The first prong thus rejects the “psychological 
coercion” theory that other circuits use. Taylor, 961 F.3d at 78 (citing Anglin, 169 F.3d at 165); see, 
e.g., Doubet, 969 F.2d at 347 (describing the defendant’s threats to the victim and the presence of a 
gun as a “figurative lock and key” restraining the victim); United States v. Lucas, 889 F.2d 697, 699 
(6th Cir. 1989) (upholding the district court’s application of a two level increase for a defendant who 
forced victims to disrobe at gunpoint because the behavior “arguably” fit the restraint enhancement). 
 62 Taylor, 961 F.3d at 78. The court noted that adoption of the first prong alone would resolve the 
split between the First, Fourth, and Tenth Circuits, which maintain that the psychological threat of a 
gun is enough to physically restrain a victim, and the other circuits, which require action beyond the 
mere presence of a gun to qualify as physical restraint under the Guidelines. Id. (citing United States 
v. Dimache, 665 F.3d 603, 607 (4th Cir. 2011)). Compare Dimache, 665 F.3d at 607 (stating that 
pointing a gun at a victim is automatically an indication of restraint), and United States v. Wallace, 
461 F.3d 15, 34 (1st Cir. 2006) (finding that threatening victims with a weapon was sufficient to phys-
ically restrain them), with United States v. Miera, 539 F.3d 1232, 1235 (10th Cir. 2008) (explaining 
that restraint only applied because the defendant ordered victims not to move using a “loud, strong 
voice” in addition to pointing a gun around the room). 
 63 Taylor, 961 F.3d at 78. In United States v. Rosario, decided in 1993, the Second Circuit noted 
that the “bodily injury” enhancements account for simple battery of victims, and that such uses of 
force do not amount to physical restraint unless the force purposefully immobilizes the victim to facil-
itate the offense. 7 F.3d at 321; see U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B3.1(b)(3) (providing the 
bodily injury enhancement). The Guidelines also provide a distinct enhancement for threats of death. 
See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B3.1(b)(2)(F) (providing a two-level enhancement if the 
defendant threatened a victim with death). Despite the separate death threat enhancement for robbery, 
courts sometimes use threats of death to support a psychological coercion argument for application of 
the physical restraint enhancement. See United States v. Davis, 29 F. App’x 535, 537 (10th Cir. 2002) 
(explicitly refusing to adopt the approach in Anglin and finding that the trial court correctly applied 
the restraint enhancement to a defendant who threatened victims with death while singling each victim 
out with a firearm). 
 64 Taylor, 961 F.3d at 78; see Rosario, 7 F.3d at 321 (using “simple battery” to describe force 
used to generate fear rather than to restrain a victim). The court referenced the dictionary definition of 
restraint: “to hold back; to check; to hold from action, proceeding, or advancing.” Taylor, 961 F.3d at 
78 (quoting Restraint, WEBSTER’S DELUXE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY (1979)). The court used this 
definition to establish that the defendant must use force to prevent the victim from proceeding in their 
movement to qualify as physical restraint within the meaning of the enhancement. Id. In an earlier 
decision on the same enhancement issue, the court stated that by choosing the conjunction “such as,” 
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The second prong of the test thus restricts the application of the enhancement to 
behavior that is not addressed more aptly by another enhancementavoiding 
double counting.65 
The third prong of the test proposed in Taylor requires that the defend-
ant’s actions go beyond the conduct inherent in the crime of robbery.66 The 
court stated that most armed robberies follow a similar pattern: the defendant 
enters a bank or store, pulls out or implies the presence of a gun, and instructs 
the occupants not to move.67 The court cautioned that an enhancement that 
applies to the basic fact pattern of most robberies ceases to be an enhancement 
for exceptional behavior and instead becomes a de facto increase of the base 
level for robbery from twenty to twenty-two.68 By limiting the application of 
the restraint enhancement to behavior which the base crime of robbery does 
not encompass, the Second Circuit expressed a desire to preserve the base level 
offense present in the Guidelines.69 
B. Alternative Tests and Approaches 
In United States v. Taylor, the Second Circuit provided a test to limit the 
application of the restraint enhancement.70 Some circuit courts, in contrast, 
approve of the application of the restraint enhancement where a defendant does 
                                                                                                                           
the Commission indicated that their examples of tying, binding, or locking up were meant to provide 
examples of the types of conduct required to rise above mere force to physical restraint. Rosario, 7 
F.3d at 320–21 (citing U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1 cmt. n.1(i)). 
 65 See Rosario, 7 F.3d at 321 (illustrating the type of force the restraint enhancement addresses, 
namely force used to restrict a victim’s mobility to facilitate the crime). The second prong of this test 
also avoids applying the restraint enhancement for the force inherent in the crime of robbery. Id. The 
court noted that applying the restraint and dangerous weapon enhancements in conjunction effectively 
doubled the minimum sentence in this case. Taylor, 961 F.3d at 82. 
 66 Taylor, 961 F.3d at 79. In the context of Taylor, the court stated that a defendant’s direction to 
clerks to move does not qualify as physical restraint because such orders are a feature of nearly all 
robberies. Id. (citing Paul, 904 F.3d at 204). The court noted that movement to another location can 
constitute restraint but only if the movement facilitates rather than constitutes the offense. Id. at 79–80 
(citing Rosario, 7 F.3d at 321). 
 67 See id. at 79 (elaborating that because most robberies are similar is this regard, it makes little 
sense to apply the enhancement to this basic set of conduct); Paul, 904 F.3d at 204 (explaining that 
because the defendant’s instruction to the victim to go to the cash register is a staple of most rob-
beries, it cannot be a valid basis for the application of an enhancement). This prong of the test sug-
gests the exact inverse of the approach that the Tenth Circuit used. See Miera, 539 F.3d at 1233 (find-
ing that instructions not to move issued at gunpoint do constitute physical restraint). 
 68 See Taylor, 961 F.3d at 79 (commenting that increasing the base offense level for most rob-
beries is likely not the intended use of the enhancement). 
 69 See id. (emphasizing that courts ought to abide by the Guidelines’ established base level of-
fense by applying the enhancement only where merited and endeavoring to limit the enhancement’s 
applicability); see also Paul, 904 F.3d at 204 (expressing the court’s desire to preserve the Commis-
sion’s assigned base level for robbery). 
 70 See 961 F.3d at 78–79 (explaining the over-application of the enhancement despite the Com-
mission’s intent and advocating for a three-part test to pare down the enhancement’s use in inappro-
priate circumstances). 
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no more than issue orders to victims at gunpoint.71 Other circuits, however, 
require something more and have created various approaches and standards to 
bring more consistency to the restraint enhancement application.72 
In 2020, in United States v. Bell, the Third Circuit found that forcing a 
victim to the ground at gunpoint was not physical restraint.73 The court identi-
fied five factors that other courts frequently use to decide whether to apply the 
restraint enhancement: use of physical force, exerting control over the victim, 
eliminating all alternatives but compliance, extended focus on an individual 
victim, and confinement.74 The court stated that none of the factors are indi-
vidually dispositive, and courts should balance them as a whole to determine 
whether the enhancement applies.75 The physical force requirement is very 
similar to the force requirement the Second Circuit described.76 Both distin-
guish between the restraint described in the Guidelines and subjective psycho-
logical restraint felt by the victim.77 The next factor, requiring the defendant to 
                                                                                                                           
 71 See, e.g., United States v. Dimache, 665 F.3d 603, 608 (4th Cir. 2011) (holding that a defend-
ant physically restrained a victim by ordering them onto the floor at gunpoint); United States v. Wal-
lace, 461 F.3d 15, 34 (1st Cir. 2006) (stating that holding a gun in front of a victim and standing in the 
exit constituted physical restraint); United States v. Fisher, 132 F.3d 1327, 1330 (10th Cir. 1997) 
(finding that a defendant who pointed a gun at a security guard’s head restrained him because the gun 
kept the guard “at bay”). 
 72 See United States v. Bell, 947 F.3d 49, 56 (3d Cir. 2020) (describing the Third Circuit’s balanc-
ing approach); United States v. Herman, 930 F.3d 872, 876 (7th Cir. 2019) (placing focus on the de-
fendant’s actions); United States v. Parker, 241 F.3d 1114, 1118 (9th Cir. 2001) (describing the sus-
tained focus standard). 
 73 Bell, 947 F.3d at 61 (finding that there was no physical restraint because the defendant took 
only a few seconds to force the victim to the ground). 
 74 Id. at 56. The court also acknowledged that, based only on the plain language of the enhance-
ment, the defendant did not “physically restrain” the victim by grabbing his neck, holding a fake gun 
to his neck, and then throwing the victim to the floor. Id. at 53, 55. The court emphasized that the 
restraint must facilitate the commission of the offense or prevent escape to qualify for the enhance-
ment. Id. at 66. 
 75 Id. at 61. Interestingly, the court only examined three of the five factorsuse of physical force, 
alternatives to compliance, and sustained focus. See id. (concluding that grabbing the victim’s neck 
and forcing him onto the floor did not meet all the requirements because, although the force was phys-
ical and the victim had to comply, the incident was too limited in duration). 
 76 See id. at 56–57 (modeling this prong after the Second Circuit’s physical force requirement in 
Anglin). 
 77 Id. The court required that the restraining force be physical rather than psychological, explicitly 
adopting the reasoning in Anglin via the D.C. Circuit’s 2000 decision in United States v. Drew. See id. 
at 56 (endorsing the physical force requirement in Drew); see also United States v. Anglin, 169 F.3d 
154, 164 (2d Cir. 1999) (requiring that the defendant’s restraint be physical in nature). In Drew, the 
D.C. Circuit used the Second Circuit’s reasoning from Anglin to conclude that the defendant’s re-
straint must be physical in nature to qualify for the enhancement. See United States v. Drew, 200 F.3d 
871, 880 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (using the Second Circuit’s logic to liken “physical” in the enhancement 
context to “physical exercise”); see also Anglin, 169 F.3d at 164 (analogizing “physical restraint” to 
“physical exercise” to illustrate that force cannot be subjective or psychological). 
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exert control over the victim, adopts the reasoning in Anglin.78 In 1999, in 
United States v. Anglin, the Second Circuit interpreted the plain meaning of the 
word “restraint” to require the defendant to limit the victim’s freedom of 
movement.79 The third factor requires that the defendant restrain the victims’ 
options such that they have no choice but to obey.80 The fourth factor examines 
whether the defendant sustained his focus on an individual victim for an ex-
tended period of time.81 The final factor asks whether the defendant placed the 
victim in a confined space.82 
In 2019, in United States v. Herman, the Seventh Circuit found that the 
district court had incorrectly applied the restraint enhancement to a defendant 
who shot at two victims that were pursuing him after a robbery.83 The court 
suggested that the focus of the enhancement ought to be on the defendant’s 
                                                                                                                           
 78 Bell, 947 F.3d at 57–58. Specifically, the Third Circuit concluded that the dictionary definition 
of restraint, to hold back or to somehow impede another from action, comports with the behavior the 
Guideline language intended to capture. See id. at 58 (citing Anglin, 169 F.3d at 164) (elaborating that 
the defendant’s actions do not restrain a victim if the victim retains the option to exit). The Ninth 
Circuit interprets the meaning of “restraint” similarly in this regard. See United States v. Foppe, 993 
F.2d 1444, 1452–53 (9th Cir. 1993) (relying on dictionary definitions of “restraint” and “forcible”). 
 79 Anglin, 169 F.3d at 164. 
 80 Bell, 947 F.3d at 57–58. The court added this factor based on decisions from the Second, Sev-
enth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits. Id.; see United States v. Victor, 719 F.3d 1288, 1290 (11th Cir. 
2013) (preventing a victim from leaving a location restricted their options and forced compliance); 
United States v. Rosario, 7 F.3d 319, 321 (2d Cir. 1993) (standing on a victim’s throat restricted the 
victim’s options); United States v. Kirtley, 986 F.2d 285, 286 (8th Cir. 1993) (forcing victims to bind 
themselves at gunpoint constituted physical restraint because the victims had no choice but to be re-
strained); United States v. Doubet, 969 F.2d 341, 347 (7th Cir. 1992) (defining force as “the operation 
of circumstances that permit no alternative to compliance” (quoting Force, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE 
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (10th ed. 1981))), abrogated on other grounds by United 
States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87 (1993). 
 81 Bell, 947 F.3d at 59. This factor, which the Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits identify, focuses 
on the increased level of distress that a victim experiences when a defendant singles them out. See 
United States v. Parker, 241 F.3d 1114, 1118 (9th Cir. 2001) (defining “sustained focus” as long enough 
to command or force a victim to walk to another location); United States v. Khleang, 3 F. App’x 672, 
675 (10th Cir. 2001) (focusing on “the nature of the victim’s harm” and noting it is one thing to be 
robbed, but another thing to be traumatized at gunpoint and ordered around); United States v. Wilson, 
198 F.3d 467, 472 (4th Cir. 1999) (pointing a gun at a victim briefly to prevent her from leaving her 
car until the defendants finished robbing her constituted restraint). 
 82 Bell, 947 F.3d at 60. Although the court grouped the fifth factor with the previous four as non-
dispositive, the Third Circuit’s previous decision in 1999, in United States v. Copenhaver, suggests 
that enclosing victims in a confined space, even if they are not secured or prevented from exiting, 
constitutes physical restraint. See 185 F.3d 178, 183 (3d Cir. 1999) (concluding that restraint applies 
where the defendant enclosed or confined a victim in a space with an actual or psychological barrier). 
 83 930 F.3d 872, 873–74 (7th Cir. 2019). The court pointed out that simply pointing a gun and 
ordering a victim not to move does not remove all the victim’s options for reaction, and, therefore, 
they are not effectively “restrained” as if they were bound, tied, or locked up. Id. at 876; see also 
United States v. Taylor, 620 F.3d 812, 813–14 (7th Cir. 2010) (stating that pointing a gun and order-
ing a victim to open a cash drawer is not similar to tying, binding, or locking up a victim). 
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actions rather than the victim’s reaction.84 As such, the court concluded that a 
defendant must take some action to deprive a victim of their “freedom of per-
sonal movement” for the restraint to be physical in nature.85 By reorienting the 
source of the restraint to the defendant’s actions, the court required behavior 
beyond merely psychological restraint to apply the enhancement.86 
Finally, in 2001, in United States v. Parker, the Ninth Circuit found that 
the restraint enhancement did not apply to a defendant whose coconspirator 
ordered a victim to lay down on the floor at gunpoint.87 Similar to Taylor, the 
court in Parker sought to apply the enhancement only in cases where the de-
fendant’s conduct exceeded briefly pointing a gun at a victim.88 The Ninth Cir-
cuit further clarified, however, that sustaining focus on a particular victim for 
an extended period of time does go beyond merely pointing a gun.89 If a de-
fendant forces a victim to walk to another location, keeps them stationary at 
gunpoint, or requires the victim to stand up and sit down multiple times, then 
the defendant has restrained the victim under the “sustained focus” standard.90 
III. REFINING THE APPLICATION OF THE RESTRAINT ENHANCEMENT 
The Second Circuit’s 2020 decision in United States v. Taylor offers an in-
tuitive test that tailors the application of the restraint enhancement to defend-
                                                                                                                           
 84 Herman, 930 F.3d at 876. A victim, although threatened, might choose to ignore the order or to 
try to escape instead of choosing to comply and is therefore not actually restrained within the meaning 
of the enhancement. See id. (distinguishing the victim’s subjective reaction to a defendant waving a 
gun around and shouting commands from actual restraint). 
 85 Id. at 875 (quoting Taylor, 620 F.3d at 814). The court explained that although there are multi-
ple ways to physically deprive a victim of movement, some action on the part of the defendant is re-
quired. Id. 
 86 See id. (documenting the court’s continued search for a way to separate “psychological coer-
cion from physical restraint”). 
 87 241 F.3d 1114, 1119 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 88 Compare United States v. Taylor, 961 F.3d 68, 81 (2d Cir. 2020) (seeking a more limited ap-
plication of the enhancement), with Parker, 241 F.3d at 1118–19 (restricting application of the en-
hancement where the defendant did no more than point a gun briefly at a victim). 
 89 Parker, 241 F.3d at 1119. The Second and Ninth Circuits provided divergent examples of con-
duct which qualifies as restraint. Compare United States v. Thompson, 109 F.3d 639, 641 (9th Cir. 
1997) (stating that ushering a victim from one location to another at gunpoint is possibly more re-
straining than dragging a victim along by the collar), with United States v. Paul, 904 F.3d 200, 203 (2d 
Cir. 2018) (explaining that forcing a victim to move at gunpoint is a common feature of robberies and 
is not comparable with the Guidelines’ examples of tying, binding, or locking). 
 90 See Parker, 241 F.3d at 1118–19 (hypothesizing that Congress intended physical restraint to 
imply more than briefly pointing a gun at a victim and commanding them to the floor because nearly 
all armed robberies involve such acts); United States v. Nelson, 137 F.3d 1094, 1112 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(concluding that the defendant restrained employees by moving them into a back room at gunpoint); 
Thompson, 109 F.3d at 641 (explaining that the defendant restrained a victim by ordering her to stand 
up and sit down multiple times at gunpoint). The court noted that a defendant can restrain a victim 
without physical contact, referencing the Guidelines’ example of locking up as a contactless form of 
restraint. Thompson, 109 F.3d at 64. 
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ants who actually fit the meaning of the enhancement.91 A uniform mechanism 
by which to apply the enhancement works toward the Guidelines’ goals of be-
ing uniform, non-arbitrary, and transparent in sentencing robbery cases.92 Sec-
tion A of this Part discusses the necessity of a test to rein in the application of 
the enhancement.93 Section B describes how the Taylor test is the clearest test 
available and most aligned with the intended purpose of the Guidelines.94 
A. The Need for a Uniform Approach to the Restraint Enhancement 
Courts need a bright line rule to direct their application of the restraint 
enhancement to better achieve the Commission’s goals of transparency, reduc-
ing disparity, and proportionality.95 By providing a base level of offense for a 
crime that applies regardless of jurisdiction, the Guidelines eliminate a source 
of inconsistency and arbitrary sentencing .96 But the Guidelines cannot pro-
mote nation-wide consistency if some courts apply the restraint enhancement 
so broadly that it encompasses conduct inherent in the crime of robbery.97 
The First, Fourth, and Tenth Circuits regularly apply the restraint en-
hancement in cases where the defendant did no more than tell victims not to 
move at gunpoint.98 These circuits often focus on the victim’s state of mind 
                                                                                                                           
 91 See 961 F.3d 68, 78–79 (2d Cir. 2020) (elaborating on the purpose and intended use of the 
test); see also U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B3.1(b) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018) (provid-
ing the language of the enhancement). 
 92 See infra notes 116–122 (elaborating on the goals of the Guidelines and how the Taylor test 
furthers those goals). 
 93 See infra notes 95–103 and accompanying text. 
 94 See infra notes 104–122 and accompanying text. 
 95 See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.3 (elaborating that the Guidelines intend to re-
duce disparity by standardizing sentencing practices); SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 15, at 8 
(describing the bi-partisan goal of the Guidelines as curtailing unwarranted disparity and inequality of 
sentencing for similar defendants convicted of similar crimes). 
 96 See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.3 (balancing simple uniformity against propor-
tionality). The Commission explained that providing a few simple categories of crimes would create 
Guidelines that are uniform and easy to administer, but it would come at the expense of homogenizing 
offenses that are different in important respects. Id. By establishing a national base level of offense for 
each specific crime, the Commission aimed to establish a basis for consistency and transparency in 
sentencing for the same crime while still providing ways to tailor a sentence to fit a defendant’s spe-
cific conduct. See id. (using armed robbery and its enhancements as an example of this balance). 
 97 See Taylor, 961 F.3d at 77 (citing United States v. Anglin, 169 F.3d 154, 165 (2d Cir. 1999)) 
(advocating for a narrower application of the restraint enhancement). The Second Circuit stated that 
liberal application of the restraint enhancement in the First, Fourth, and Tenth Circuits to scenarios 
that are typical to nearly all robberies effectively increases the base offense level for the crime of 
robbery in those courts. Id. 
 98 See, e.g., United States v. Wade, 719 F. App’x 822, 827 (10th Cir. 2017) (emphasizing that 
restraint occurs when a victim is “specifically prevented at gunpoint” from moving to facilitate the 
robbery (quoting United States v. Fisher, 132 F.3d 1327, 1329–30 (10th Cir. 1997))); United States v. 
McNeil, 539 F. App’x 190, 192 (4th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (citing United States v. Dimache, 665 
F.3d 603, 607 (4th Cir. 2011)) (endorsing a broad view of the enhancement, applying it if a defendant 
points a gun at a victim); United States v. Wallace, 461 F.3d 15, 34 (1st Cir. 2006) (defining physical 
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rather than the defendant’s behavior when choosing to apply the enhance-
ment.99 Perhaps this attitude stems from the court’s sympathy for the victims 
of armed robbery or from innate hostility towards defendants who threaten 
victims.100 Regardless of the outrage a court may feel toward a defendant who 
“menaced” a victim during an armed robbery, the Guideline system is intended 
to identify a defendant’s criminal behavior rather than the reaction of a third 
party.101 In addition, the restraint enhancement is not the only mechanism by 
which a court can increase the Guideline range for robbery.102 Applying the 
restraint enhancement so liberally that it impacts a defendant who does no 
                                                                                                                           
restraint as whenever a victim is “specifically prevented at gunpoint from moving” (quoting Fisher, 
132 F.3d at 1329–30)). 
 99 Compare Wallace, 461 F.3d at 34 (justifying the application of the enhancement by describing 
the “intense, one-on-one nature” of a victim’s experience during an armed robbery), and Fisher, 132 
F.3d at 1329–30 (emphasizing that physical restraint may occur without physical contact if a victim 
feels incapable of movement or escape because of the presence of a firearm), with United States v. 
Garcia, 857 F.3d 708, 713 (5th Cir. 2017) (declining to apply the enhancement because a victim’s 
subjective feeling of restraint is not interchangeable with physical restraint where victims are tied, 
bound, or locked up). 
 100 See Wallace, 461 F.3d at 34 (describing the nature of armed robbery as “intense” and “one-on-
one” for the victims). Courts with broad applications of the enhancement often use language to em-
phasize the terrifying nature of the victim’s experience and the frightening characteristics of the de-
fendant. See, e.g., McNeil, 539 F. App’x at 191 (describing the defendant’s conduct as “actually men-
acing” the victims); United States v. Miera, 539 F.3d 1232, 1235 (10th Cir. 2008) (emphasizing the 
defendant’s “loud, strong voice,” domineering nature, and “haphazard” gun use to intimidate the vic-
tims into submission); United States v. Ossai, 485 F.3d 25, 32 (1st Cir. 2007) (noting that the defend-
ant was capable of forcing a “large and powerful man” to his knees); United States v. Khleang, 3 
F. App’x 672, 675 (10th Cir. 2001) (including in the court’s reasoning that the defendant was “in very 
close physical proximity” to the victim and spoke vulgarly). 
 101 See McNeil, 539 F. App’x at 191 (using the term “menacing” to refer to pointing a gun at a 
victim). Although the Guidelines encourage judges to tailor the sentence to the facts of the case and 
the conduct of the defendant, the purpose of the Guidelines is to create a standardized framework for 
sentencing. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (providing the factors judges must consider during sentenc-
ing); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 250–51 (2005) (emphasizing the need to balance a 
judge’s discretion with the Guidelines’ goal of reducing sentencing disparities). Using an enhance-
ment as a stick with which to beat an unsympathetic defendant undermines the intended use of en-
hancements. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, FEDERAL SENTENCING: THE BASICS 14 (2018), https://www.
ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-publications/2020/202009_fed-
sentencing-basics.pdf [https://perma.cc/2UWA-L3TC] (explaining that the intended use of adjust-
ments is to account for common mitigating and aggravating behavior across offenses). 
 102 See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B3.1(b)(1)–(7) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018) 
(providing more than ten possible enhancements to the crime of robbery). Enhancements are available 
for defendants who fire, brandish, possess, or “otherwise use” a firearm during the commission of a rob-
bery. Id. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(A)–(E). According to the Guidelines’ application instructions, “brandished” 
includes display, announcement, or use of a firearm to intimidate another person for an increase of 
five points on the base offense level for robbery. Id. § 1B1.1 app. n.1(C). Based on this definition, the 
enhancement for brandishing a firearm is a closer fit for the threatening behavior that some circuits 
identified. See, e.g., McNeil, 539 F. App’x at 191 (applying enhancements for both restraint of a vic-
tim and for brandishing a firearm arising out of a codefendant’s order for a clerk to move to the cash 
register). 
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more than point a gun at a victim undermines the Commission’s goal of con-
sistency by double counting conduct inherent in the offense of armed robbery.103 
B. The Taylor Test Best Achieves the Goals of the Guidelines 
Of the rules for application of the restraint enhancement that the Third, 
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits created, the test proposed in Taylor best serves the 
purposes of the Guidelines.104 The balancing approach that the Third Circuit 
outlined in 2000, in United States v. Bell, is an excellent survey of common 
factors that can lead to application of the restraint enhancement, but it ulti-
mately fails as a useful rule for application.105 Because the balancing approach 
is based on an inventory from circuits that are split on this issue, some of the 
factors are mutually exclusive.106 Balancing conflicting factors is even more 
                                                                                                                           
 103 See United States v. Paul, 904 F.3d 200, 204 (2d Cir. 2018) (warning that application of the 
restraint enhancement in cases where it simply adds punishment to conduct typical to most robberies 
is improper); United States v. Anglin, 169 F.3d 154, 165 (2d Cir. 1999) (stating that the “practical” 
result of defining physical restraint to include threatening victims with a gun is to increase the base 
level in most robbery cases, which is a “problematic effect” for a specialized enhancement); United 
States v. Parker, 136 F.3d 653, 654 (9th Cir. 1998) (clarifying that double counting occurs in a Guide-
line context when a court uses the same conduct more than once to increase a sentence); Barth, supra 
note 31, at 186 (explaining that double counting occurs when a court uses conduct that is inherent in 
the base offense to apply an enhancement). The Commission chose the base level of offense for each 
Guideline crime based on a study of enabling legislation, legislative history, empirical data, and lead-
ing theories of punishment and urges courts to avoid frivolously altering the carefully and expensively 
crafted Guideline system. See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.3 (elucidating that the Com-
mission did not select the base level of offense for each crime randomly). 
 104 See United States v. Taylor, 961 F.3d 68, 79 (2d Cir. 2020) (explaining that the restraint en-
hancement is warranted only when the restraint was physical in nature, the physical force actually 
restrained the victim, and the restraint went beyond the conduct inherent in the robbery); United States 
v. Bell, 947 F.3d 49, 56 (3d Cir. 2020) (describing five factors to consider when applying the restraint 
enhancement); United States v. Herman, 930 F.3d 872, 875 (7th Cir. 2019) (requiring defendant’s 
conduct to be comparable to physically immobilizing a victim); United States v. Parker, 241 F.3d 
1114, 1118 (9th Cir. 2001) (adopting a “sustained focus” standard). 
 105 See 947 F.3d at 56 (explaining that the court arrived at the five factors by examining the meth-
ods that other circuits use). 
 106 See id. at 58 (distilling the rationale from other courts into five factors). For example, the first 
factor, which requires the force to be physical rather than merely psychological, implies a narrower 
application than the third factor, which allows the application of the enhancement to defendants who 
do no more than ensure the victim’s compliance. Id. The cases that the court cited for these proposi-
tions show that the factors came from unreconcilable decisions from circuits opposed on this very 
issue. Compare Anglin, 169 F.3d at 164 (vacating a sentence because merely displaying a weapon 
does not qualify as physical force within the meaning of the enhancement, even if the victim felt re-
strained), with United States v. Victor, 719 F.3d 1288, 1290 (11th Cir. 2013) (upholding the applica-
tion of the enhancement because displaying a gun, even without the use of physical force, effectively 
restrains the victim). These are incompatible interpretations of “physical restraint,” with Anglin de-
clining to focus on the victim’s subjective psychological state and Victor embracing it. See Victor, 719 
F.3d at 1290 (focusing on the fact that the particular employee felt frightened and was therefore re-
strained); Anglin, 169 F.3d at 164 (noting that one set of circumstances may restrain a timid person 
but have no impact on a bold person and concluding that the Sentencing Commission must intend a 
more precise concept). The fourth factor, sustained focus on a particular victim, and the fifth, place-
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difficult because the court examines the factors as a whole and none are indi-
vidually dispositive.107 Given the uncertainty baked into the rule, it is unclear 
how a court should evaluate the factors to reach a clear conclusion.108 
In 2019, in United States v. Herman, the Seventh Circuit suggested re-
focusing the application of the enhancement on the actions of the defendant by 
searching for conduct that elevates the restraint from subjective and psychologi-
cal to objective and physical.109 Although this rule comports with the purpose of 
enhancements in general, the additional physical conduct that the court described 
is difficult to divorce from the facts of Herman.110 This rule may prove to be a 
useful yardstick for courts within the circuit, but a highly referential test is of 
limited utility to other jurisdictions.111 Overall, the exclusion of psychological 
                                                                                                                           
ment of the victim in a confined space, are similarly in conflict. See Bell, 947 F.3d at 59, 60 (provid-
ing the antithetical factors). Compare United States v. Copenhaver, 185 F.3d 178, 182–83 (3d Cir. 
1999) (finding that shutting a victim in a fireplace is restraint only because the conduct goes beyond 
merely pointing a gun at a victim), with United States v. Khleang, 3 F. App’x 672, 675 (10th Cir. 
2001) (affirming application of the restraint enhancement because having a gun pointed at a victim for 
even a brief period is sufficient to restrain them). 
 107 See Bell, 947 F.3d at 56 (confirming that no one factor is dispositive and all factors have equal 
weight). Given the indeterminate weight of each of the factors, it is unclear whether a court faced with 
facts similar to those in Taylor should apply the restraint enhancement. See 961 F.3d at 72 (evaluating 
a defendant who did not have a real gun but nevertheless threatened victims and ordered them out of 
the way, herding them into a back room but not locking or guarding egress). Even in deciding Bell, the 
court appears to have had trouble deciding how to apply the factors. See 947 F.3d at 61 (discussing 
only three of the five identified factors before reaching a decision). 
 108 See Bell, 947 F.3d at 56 (lacking guidance for application of the factors). 
 109 See 930 F.3d at 875 (identifying the Guidelines’ term “physical force” as evidence that the 
Commission intended to exclude psychological force from the enhancement). The court expressed a 
desire to take a “middle position” by emphasizing that restraint must be physical in nature to justify 
the enhancement. Id. at 875–76. 
 110 See id. at 875 (defining restraint as “depriving a person of his freedom of physical movement” 
(quoting United States v. Taylor, 620 F.3d 812, 814 (7th Cir. 2010))). In Herman, it was clear that the 
victims were not psychologically or physically restrained because they chased after the defendant 
despite having a gun pointed and fired at them. See id. at 873 (noting that the defendant’s order for the 
victims to stay where they were did not give them pause). Given these facts, the court’s insistence that 
restraint depends not on a victim’s subjective reaction but on the defendant’s actions rings hollow 
because the subjective reaction of the threatened victims was to chase the defendant outside. Id. 
 111 See id. at 875 (defining the limits of the enhancement based on facts of other cases that the 
court decided). Much of the test suggested in Herman builds on previous decisions from the circuit. 
See id. at 876 (citing United States v. Carter, 410 F.3d 942, 954 (7th Cir. 2005)) (using past examples 
from within the circuit). For example, the court stated that it wished to refine its definition of restraint 
to comport with its decisions in earlier in-circuit cases. See Herman, 930 F.3d at 876 (regretting that 
the “middle position” it had attempted to create previously was too expansive); see also Taylor, 620 
F.3d at 812 (holding that forcing a victim to stand up and lay down multiple times at gunpoint was 
physical restraint); United States v. Doubet, 969 F.2d 341, 346 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating that directing 
victims into a back room at gunpoint constituted physical restraint), abrogated on other grounds by 
United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87 (1993). The court’s references to its 2010 decision to apply 
the enhancement to a defendant who made a victim stand up and sit down more than once in Taylor 
may prove especially confusing for courts applying this rule. See Taylor, 620 F.3d at 813 (describing 
that the defendant’s conduct had the same “effect on the victim” as physically tying or binding her). In 
Taylor, the court emphasized that despite the facts of the robbery, it decided whether to apply the 
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force narrows the scope of the enhancement, but it leaves application questions 
unanswered.112 The sustained focus approach that the Ninth Circuit established 
in Parker, in 2001, suffers from similar ambiguity.113 Even defining the time 
necessary to “sustain” focus on a particular victim as time sufficient to walk vic-
tims to another location, as the court prescribed, the measure is highly varia-
ble.114 Most importantly, the sustained focus test still endorses applying the en-
hancement to defendants who do no more than point a gun at a victim.115 
                                                                                                                           
enhancement based on whether pointing a gun and directing a victim constituted physical restraint 
rather than on other grounds. Id. By referencing that decision in Herman, however, the Seventh Cir-
cuit labeled that distinction as merely dictum. See 930 F.3d at 876 (stressing that the use of a gun was 
not the basis for the enhancement, despite the earlier words of the court). Because the court defined 
the limits of the application of the restraint enhancement largely based on these prior decisions, the 
consequences of imprecise language are magnified and limit the ability of the test to resolve the circuit 
split. Id. 
 112 See Herman, 930 F.3d at 877 (explaining that the enhancement was only created for instances 
of physical, forcible restraint). In Herman, the court clearly stated that being held at gunpoint alone is 
not physical restraint and, thus, limited the breadth of the enhancement. Id. at 876. 
 113 See United States v. Parker, 241 F.3d 1114, 1118 (9th Cir. 2001) (identifying overuse of the 
restraint enhancement as a problem but offering only the sustained focus standard as a limiting princi-
ple). The court found that physical restraint requires a sustained focus on a particular victim, agreeing 
with the Second Circuit that physical restraint requires more than momentarily pointing a gun at a 
victim. Id. at 1119 (citing United States v. Anglin, 169 F.3d 154, 164 (2d Cir. 1999)). The court’s 
definition of “sustained focus,” unfortunately, is troublingly undeveloped. See id. at 1118 (offering 
only that “sustained focus” is long enough for a victim to walk somewhere). Drawing on United States 
v. Thompson, which the Ninth Circuit decided in 1997, and United States v. Nelson, decided in 1998, 
the court clarified that “sustained” meant at least long enough for a defendant to walk a victim at gun-
point from one location to another, although Thompson implies that the time it takes to force a victim 
to stand up and sit down may also be sufficient. See id. at 1118 (clarifying that “sustained” means 
singling out an individual victim); see also United States v. Nelson, 137 F.3d 1094, 1112 (9th Cir. 
1998) (clarifying that a defendant can restrain a victim by merely pointing a gun at a victim); United 
States v. Thompson, 109 F.3d 639, 641 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding that the defendant physically re-
strained a victim by forcing them to stand up and sit down multiple times). 
 114 See Parker, 241 F.3d at 1118 (requiring that the defendant focus on a particular victim for at 
least as long as it takes to walk from one side of the room to another at gunpoint). In 2010, in United 
States v. Albritton, the Ninth Circuit created perhaps the clearest example of the sustained focus test, 
finding that a defendant who walked a victim from a bank lobby to an office at gunpoint had physical-
ly restrained her. 622 F.3d 1104, 1105, 1108 (9th Cir. 2010). Even in this example it is not clear 
whether it was the defendant’s focus on the victim that caused the court to find restraint or, rather, the 
combination of the gun and the movement from her office and back that elevated briefly pointing a 
gun at a victim to physical restraint. See id. at 1108 (explaining that the presence of the gun and the 
command to the victim to move constituted restraint). 
 115 See Albritton, 622 F.3d at 1108 (directing a victim across an office space at gunpoint qualifies 
as sustained focus); Parker, 241 F.3d at 1118 (explaining that this standard includes defendants who 
direct victims at gunpoint to remain still). The Sixth Circuit noted that the application of the sustained 
focus test would have afforded the same result as the psychological restraint approach. See United 
States v. Coleman, 664 F.3d 1047, 1050 (6th Cir. 2012) (noting that a defendant commanding a victim 
to step out from his office into a less-confined area at gunpoint physically restrained the victim within 
the meaning of the enhancement). 
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The Second Circuit’s Taylor test is clear and refines the application of the 
enhancement within the plain meaning of “physical restraint.”116 The first prong 
unambiguously eliminates the psychological force argument used to justify the 
application of the enhancement to defendants who do no more than point a gun 
at a victim.117 By doing so, the court reduced the risk of double counting.118 
Secondly, the test requires that the defendant used physical force to restrain the 
victim rather than for another purpose, thus separating restraint from similar en-
hancements.119 Finally, the court clarified that an instruction to move alone is not 
sufficient to qualify as restraint.120 Movement can qualify as a restraining force, 
but only if the defendant confines the victims in some manner.121 By clearly ad-
dressing and categorizing the most common armed robbery scenarios, Taylor 
provided a clear test that is easy to apply across the country.122 
                                                                                                                           
 116 See United States v. Taylor, 961 F.3d 68, 79 (2d Cir. 2020) (illustrating the test); infra notes 
54–56 and accompanying text (describing the prongs in detail). 
 117 See Taylor, 961 F.3d at 78 (clarifying that although brandishing a gun may cause victims to 
feel restrained, it does not physically restrain them). The first prong of the Taylor test addresses the 
psychological and physical force distinction identified in Herman, but refines it by focusing on the 
plain meaning of the enhancement text instead of relying on circuit precedent to illustrate the distinc-
tion. See id. (stating explicitly that a victim’s subjective feeling of restraint does not warrant applica-
tion of the enhancement); Herman, 930 F.3d at 875 (citing multiple circuit cases as examples and 
counter examples of when the enhancement applies). 
 118 See Taylor, 961 F.3d at 78 (expressing a desire to “cabin” the use of the restraint enhance-
ment); see also U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.3 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2018) (not-
ing that the Commission intended to replace the arbitrary and opaque nature of pre-Guidelines sen-
tencing practices). Ambiguous language can interfere with the Guidelines’ goals of providing a fair 
and transparent system of punishment. See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.3 (stating that 
the Commission intended the Guidelines to provide proportionality and clarity to the sentencing pro-
cess). 
 119 See Taylor, 961 F.3d at 78 (citing United States v. Rosario, 7 F.3d 319, 321 (2d Cir. 1993)) 
(noting that courts should use physical injury enhancements for any non-restraining force). This prong 
clearly sorts fact patterns, such as Fisher, where the defendant touches or manhandles victims but 
does not restrain them, into a category other than restraining force. Compare United States v. Fisher, 
132 F.3d 1327, 1329 (10th Cir. 1997) (finding that the defendants restrained a security guard by hit-
ting him over the head), with Rosario, 7 F.3d at 321 (finding that despite the defendant’s other violent 
acts, it was the physical force of stepping on the victim’s neck that qualified as restraining force). 
 120 Taylor, 961 F.3d at 79. Not only is an “instruction to move” typical of most robberies, but 
such an instruction is not immobilizing. Id. (citing United States v. Paul, 904 F.3d 200, 204 (2d Cir. 
2018)). This prevents the application of the enhancement to facts typical of armed robberies, reducing 
disparity between similarly situated defendants. Id. at 78. 
 121 See id. at 79 (elaborating that confinement can qualify as restraint, but only if it is equivalent 
to tying, binding, or locking up a victim). A general application of the enhancement transforms what 
the Commission intended as a special provision for additional punishment to a standard feature. See 
United States v. Anglin, 169 F.3d 154, 165 (2d Cir. 1999) (describing such a result as “problematic”). 
 122 See Taylor, 961 F.3d at 79 (providing a three-part test to limit the overuse of the restraint en-
hancement). 
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CONCLUSION 
The test the Second Circuit provided in 2020, in United States v. Taylor, 
has the potential to refine the application of the restraint enhancement to be 
fairer to defendants and more consistent with the goals of the Guidelines. The 
First, Fourth, and Tenth Circuits’ broad application of the enhancement has 
warped the plain meaning of the terms “physical” and “restraint” to the detri-
ment of defendants within their jurisdictions. Although the Third, Seventh, and 
Ninth Circuits have taken action to tailor the application of the enhancement 
with various rules, ambiguity and impracticality has barred widespread ac-
ceptance. The Second Circuit, however, has incorporated the observations of 
these other approaches in its analysis in Taylor to address and clarify the most 
common sources of disagreement surrounding the enhancement. As a result, 
the Taylor test is clear, simple to apply, and designed to further the goals of the 
Guidelines. 
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